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Abstract
Background: Despite the increased prevalence of bioethics research that seeks to use empirical data to answer
normative research questions, there is no consensus as to what an appropriate methodology for this would be.
This review aims to search the literature, present and critically discuss published Empirical Bioethics methodologies.
Methods: MedLine, Web of Science and Google Scholar were searched between 15/02/12 and 16/06/13 to find
relevant papers. These were abstract reviewed independently by two reviewers with papers meeting the inclusion
criteria subjected to data extraction.
Results: 33 publications (32 papers and one book chapter) were included which contained 32 distinct methodologies.
The majority of these methodologies (n = 22) can be classed as either dialogical or consultative, and these represent
two extreme ‘poles’ of methodological orientation. Consideration of these results provoked three central questions that
are central to the planning of an empirical bioethics study, and revolve around how a normative conclusion can be
justified, the analytic process through which that conclusion is reached, and the kind of conclusion that is sought.
Conclusion: When considering which methodology or research methods to adopt in any particular study, researchers
need to think carefully about the nature of the claims they wish to generate through their analyses, and how these
claims align with the aims of the research. Whilst there are superficial similarities in the ways that identical research
methods are made use of, the different meta-ethical and epistemological commitments that undergird the range of
methodological approaches adopted rehearse many of the central foundational disagreements that play out within
moral philosophy and bioethical analysis more broadly. There is little common ground that transcends these
disagreements, and we argue that this is likely to present a challenge for the legitimacy of the bioethical
enterprise. We conclude, however, that this heterogeneity ought to be welcomed, but urge those involved in
the field to engage meaningfully and explicitly with questions concerning what kinds of moral claim they
want to be able to make, about normative justification and the methodological process, and about the
coherence of these components within their work.
Keywords: Empirical bioethics, Method, Methodology, Integrated ethics, Coherence, Consensus, Epistemology
Background
This paper reports a systematic review of methodologies
related to a particular kind of empirical bioethics (EB)
research – specifically, methodologies that seek to use
empirical data about stakeholder values, attitudes, beliefs
and experiences to inform normative ethical theorising.
‘Empirical bioethics’ is a generic and broad term in-
creasingly used to describe a particular kind of research
endeavour that seeks to ask and answer questions of bio-
ethical interest in a way that draws on the strengths of
both philosophical and empirical analysis [1-4]. Its ‘rise’
can, in part, be seen as a response to the social science cri-
tique of philosophical bioethics, as described by Hedgecoe
[5], which challenges what is seen as ‘traditional’ philo-
sophical bioethics to become more contextually aware and
more grounded in the realities of lived experience. In the
context of this review we are, therefore, particularly inter-
ested in looking at methodologies that seek to use social
scientific data (usually about stakeholder attitudes, beliefs
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and experiences) to inform and enhance ethical analyses
of topics of bioethical interest.
Even thus specified, the term ‘empirical bioethics’ is
commonly understood to refer to a wide range of vary-
ing methodologies that have different views about how
best to respond to the challenge of connecting normative
bioethical analysis to the realities of lived moral experi-
ence. There is considerable uncertainty about the range
and substance of these methodologies, and there remains
a difficulty in trying to articulate their aims and content.
One standard response has been to articulate typologies
that differentiate between different kinds of research en-
deavour, and a number of useful typologies have, to date,
been put forward to describe how philosophical theory
and data can be combined [6-10]. DeVries [6], for ex-
ample, offers a four-part typology that distinguishes be-
tween practical research strategies that: (i) use empirical
data to describe attitudes toward an issue; (ii) use empir-
ical data to explore the likely or actual consequences of
bioethical policies and decisions; (iii) use empirical data to
explore the ‘implicit normativity’ in scientific/clinical prac-
tice, and (iv) use empirical data to understand the institu-
tion of bioethics.
An alternative, and quite different, typology is offered
by Molewijk et al. [9] , who distinguish between differ-
ent kinds of research strategy by reference to the locus
of moral authority in order to clarify how best to arrive
at a normative conclusion. Their typology differentiates
between four research strategies that: (i) give complete
authority to moral theory, and only use empirical data to
provide evidence for premises or support factual claims;
(ii) give precedence to moral theory but accommodate a
one-way relationship between theory and data such that
empirical research can be used to refine theory; (iii) give
equal authority to both theory and data, such that both
theory and interpretation of data can be adjusted in light
of the other, and: (iv) remove theory altogether from eth-
ical analysis and focus only on the particulars, which are
identified through empirical research.
These typologies of general research strategies are use-
ful because they begin to carve out the field according to
what a piece of research might seek to achieve, and help-
fully distinguishes between various ways of thinking about
the research endeavour. What they do not do is explore the
detail of, and differentiate between, different methodologies
that fall within each of those strategies. A useful addition to
this field would be, therefore, a systematic review of the
methodological variation within these strategies. We note
that systematic reviews in the field of bioethics are relatively
rare, although their use is increasingly proposed [11,12].
The rationale for conducting a systematic review, as op-
posed to the narrative reviews that we can find in the litera-
ture to date, are, as Strech and Sofaer point out: “to reveal a
greater range of…information than the informal reviews …
that are usual in bioethics and philosophy, which sample
literature using unsystematic, undocumented search
methods to the unspecified point at which it seems to
the author (often the only author) that [nothing new
emerges]” [11], p122.
This paper reports a systematic review focussing spe-
cifically on methodological strategies that seek to draw
normative conclusions through the integration of social
scientific empirical data collection/analysis and normative/
ethical theorising. This might best be thought of as falling
within Molewijk et al's. [9] category of both Critical Applied
Ethics or Integrated Ethics, and which we describe simply
as being ‘integrative’. This integrative approach seems to
offer the best chance, at least in theory, of genuinely acces-
sing the strengths of both the empirical and the philo-
sophical contributions, and through our engagement with
the field to date we felt that it is the approach that has re-
ceived the most methodological attention, is the most het-
erogeneous, and is most in need of systematic review. In
addition, the report from the first workshop of the UK
based Interdisciplinary and Empirical Ethics Network
(IEEN) [13], concluded that there are important questions
to ask about, inter alia:
1. What kinds of normative conclusions empirical
bioethics ought to be aiming for, suggesting that
“[t]he debate over whether their research seeks
objective and universalisable answers, or more
subjective and particularist answers, is perhaps best
worked out locally given the particular aims and
agendas defined in each research project”. [13] p160.
2. The way that empirical bioethics seeks to provide
justification for its conclusions, stating that “The
fundamental question concerning justificatory
authority - how we can articulate why and how our
conclusions can be considered better, or worse, than
anyone else’s – remains unresolved”. [13] p160.
Our focus on this kind of integrated empirical bioethics
is, ultimately, premised on our personal interest in pursu-
ing and developing methodologies for bioethics research
that take seriously the empirical and the contextual, but
which are also concerned with producing normative con-
clusions and justification for those conclusions. That is
not to say this is the only kind of legitimate bioethics
activity – only that it is the activity we are primarily
concerned with and interested in. It is also a research
strategy of central importance to the field of bioethics that
has been well-recognised by other scholars as being
in need of further development, reflection and scrutiny
[14-16]. Other reviews of different kinds of empirical bio-
ethics activity would undoubtedly be a welcome addition
to the literature and give rise to different theoretical and
methodological implications.
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With this in mind, this review aimed to:
1. Identify the number and range of published
‘integrative’ empirical bioethics methodologies
available.
2. Explore differences and similarities between those
published methodologies, with a view to identifying
and discussing key questions about aims, analytic
process and justification that differentiate between
different kinds of methodologies.
Methods
The initial search for this review was conducted between
February and March 2012. The review was conducted in
accordance with the Cochrane guidelines [17]a. Three da-
tabases (Google Scholar, Web of Science and MedLine)
were searched, up until 16/03/2012. These three databases
were chosen because we found that, between them, they
indexed all the kinds of journals in which our target
papers were likely to be published. Given the time and re-
source restrictions on the projectb, we made a conscious
decision to use databases that would index likely jour-
nals; i.e. those that publish papers around the nexus
of medicine, healthcare, ethics, philosophy and research
methodologies.
Broad search terms were used to allow for the wide vari-
ation in terms we knew to be present in the literature,
with a separate set of terms to ensure that only papers
including a methodology were returned. The most sig-
nificant difficulty we had lay in the fact that there is
no agreed terminology used to label this kind of research
endeavour, and so we aimed to develop a very wide and
inclusive search strategy. Numerous scoping searches
were performed using Google Scholar to select terms
that were able to identify relevant papers without turning
up thousands of papers that were irrelevant. The initial
search terms, developed after scoping searches, were:
(“Empirical Bioethics” OR “Evidence Based Bioethics”
OR “Interdisciplinary Bioethics” OR “Empirical Ethics”)
AND
(Methodology* OR Method* OR Process*)
This produced approximately 1240 search results, of
which 37.5% of the first 150 passed title screening.
When applied to MedLine, however, this search pro-
duced only 19 results of which 18 passed title screening.
This indicated that our search terms were sensitive to
keywords used on Google Scholar but not MedLine.
The search was therefore extended to include additional
and, arguably, less technical terms, that seemed likely
to capture papers that talked about relevant method-
ologies without naming them. These additions increased
the sensitivity of the search in Medline, and had no
significant effect in Google Scholar. The final set of search
terms used were:
(“Empirical Bioethics” OR “Evidence based bioethics”
OR “Interdisciplinary bioethics” OR “Empirical Ethics”
OR “Social sciences perspectives on bioethics” OR
“Empirical Research in Bioethics” OR “Empirical-
Ethical Research” OR “”Ethics-Related Empirical
Research”)
AND
(Methodology* OR Method* OR Process*)
Truncations were used to cover the second phase of
the search in order to include all forms of the words.
Both ‘methodology’ and ‘method’ were used, to allow for
the fact that some authors may refer to the overriding
process as a ‘method’.
No limits were placed on the publication date, mean-
ing that any relevant papers, regardless of publication
date, would be found. A small secondary search was also
performed using existing bibliographies of EB literature c
and by searching the references of included papers.
Search results were title screened by RD for relevance,
followed by abstract review against the inclusion criteria
(see List of Criteria for inclusion into review). Multiple
papers by the same author could be included, as could
publications not exclusively aimed at bioethics if they
met all other criteriad. Abstract review was performed
independently by two reviewers (RD and JI), who rated
the papers as either ‘accept’, ‘reject’, or ‘unclear’. Both re-
viewers met to compare their independent reviews. All
abstracts for which there were concordant ‘agree’ reviews
were accepted for data extraction. All papers for which
there was a concordant ‘reject’ review were eliminated. In
the case of disagreement, or when either reviewer was un-
sure, the entire paper was screened followed by the same
review process. Included papers were subjected to data ex-
traction using a pre-formed data-extraction sheet, which
recorded details on aims, methods and epistemological/
philosophical assumptions (see List of Headings from
Data Extraction sheet).
List of criteria for inclusion into review
 Paper or book chapter
 Written in English
 Discusses concept of ‘EB’, even if the phrase itself
isn’t used
 Details a methodology
 Aims to draw normative conclusions (not just
description, sociological analyses or gathering data
to support factual premises in argument)
 Does not have to specifically deal with bioethics if
the methodology is transferrable
Davies et al. BMC Medical Ethics  (2015) 16:15 Page 3 of 13
List of headings from data extraction sheet
 Title of paper
 Author/s
 Name of methodology
 Stepwise procedure given/Overarching process
described (tick boxes)
 Linear/Cyclical/Iterative/Other or none (tick boxes)
 Aim of the research/conclusion
 Details of data collection method
 Data analysis method given (if not provided why
not/what is said about data analysis)
 Details of method for developing normative
outcomes
 Philosophical commitments stated/implied
 Social scientific commitments stated/implied
 Theories in opposition and why: Author stated/
reviewer
 Strengths and weaknesses- Philosophical: Author
stated/Reviewer identified
 Strengths and weaknesses- Practical: Author
stated/Reviewer identified
 Other notes
The extracted data were then used to categorise the meth-
odologies, with the aim of identifying similarities and differ-
ences in the processes used and grouping them according to
those similarities.. These process categories were then scru-
tinised to see if further sub-categories were warranted.
In May 2013 the search was repeated to update the re-
sults with a view to publication. The same search terms,
databases, screening methods and inclusion criteria were
used as in the initial search. This search was limited to
show only results published since 2012 to minimise the
number of duplications from the original search. Again,
a secondary search of included papers’ references was
undertaken, as well as any recent additions to EB read-
ing list and bibliographies. Methods of review and data
extraction were performed as described above.
Interpretation and analysis
Data extraction allowed the key methodological charac-
teristics of each paper to be identified and summarised,
which helped us begin the interpretive process of cat-
egorisation. The papers were then initially categorised
and sub-categorised on the basis of the methodological
process they use. On occasion, multiple papers, often by
the same authors, discussed the same processes and these
were combined to remove duplication. One paper de-
scribed three different methodologies. This resulted in the
identification of 32 distinct methodologies, spread across
33 different papers.
The categorisation of papers was driven by our a priori
focus on methodology; and our analysis was directed
towards looking for methodological similarity and dis-
similarity and, at least initially, informed by the work-
shop report on the IEEN (13), which called for more
information on justification, process and aims. Our data
extraction sheet mirrored differences that we had ob-
served in the literature - for example, was the research
process cyclical, linear or iterative? Whilst this helped us
to structure our initial thinking, those three categories
were not ultimately useful, as they did not fully capture
what we felt were the key aspects of the methodologies
that were included.
The categories and subcategories we ended up using
were generated through a process of reflection and in-
duction. After data extraction was complete, RD, JI and
MD met to discuss how to categorise the 32 methodolo-
gies, and agreed on an initial two-way categorisation that
distinguished between ‘dialogical’ and ‘consultative’ ap-
proaches, based on a fundamental difference. These two
categories arose naturally from the data, as the method-
ologies tended to either generate normative conclusions
with participants through a dialogue, or generate norma-
tive conclusions after consulting with participants in
some way. We then attempted to place each methodology
into one of those categories, and then considered whether
those methodologies that did not clearly fit into either cat-
egory provided evidence that the two categories were
wrong, or that these categories needed to be extended. On
closer examination, a few methodologies seemed to en-
compass elements of both categories, and some were
clearly neither dialogical nor consultative but had nothing
sufficiently in common to generate a new meaningful cat-
egory. A similar reflective and inductive process was then
used to examine methodologies within each category,
leading to the consultative category being split into more
specific groupings that shared a common and distinctive
methodological characteristics.
Results
A total of 36 publications were initially selected for data
extraction. Three were then excluded for not meeting
the inclusion criteria, having been included on abstract
alone, leaving 33 publications included (see Table 1).
The PRISMA diagram in Figure 1 depicts the search and
screening process over the two searches conducted.
Figure 2 (below) illustrates the way the included method-
ologies were categorised. The majority of the methodolo-
gies outlined in these publications (n = 22) can be classed
as either dialogical or consultative, and these represent
two extreme ‘poles’ of methodological orientation. Three
methodologies appear to use a combination, or could use
either. On one pole we find Dialogical approaches, which
are based around the formation of a dialogue between
stakeholders and the attempt to reach a shared understand-
ing, in which the analysis, and reaching of a conclusion, is
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Table 1 Table showing included publications, with brief summary of methodology described
ID Publication reference Methodology Summary of process described
1 de Wachter M. Interdisciplinary bioethics: But where do
we start? A reflection on epoche as method. Journal of
medicine and philosophy 1982, 7(3): 275–288.
Interdisciplinary Epoche Approach to interdisciplinary working in
bioethics, not specific EB methodology
2 Hoffmaster B. Can ethnography save the life of medical
ethics? Social science & medicine 1992, 35(12):1421–1431.
Ethnography Data (ethnography) driven, non-specific integration
and generation of normative conclusions
3 Ten Have H, Lelie, A. Medical ethics research between
theory and practice. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
1998, 19(3):263–276.
Normative Ethnography Ethnography based consultative approach, giving
equal weight to data and ethical theory
4 Richardson J. Empirical Ethics, Or, The Poverty of
Ethical Analyses in Economics and the Unwarranted
Disregard of Evidence in Ethics. Working paper 120.
Centre for Health Program Evaluation, Monash University
2001.
Iterative Population-based
Ethics (name assigned by
reviewer)
Consultative approach that tests and refines ethical
principles in light of population views
5 Battin M. Empirical research in bioethics: the method
of" oppositional collaboration. Notizie di Politeia 2001, 18
(67): 15–19.
Oppositional Collaboration Methodology for how researchers should approach EB
as opposed to describing a research methodology
6 Martin D, Singer P. A strategy to improve priority
setting in health care institutions. Health Care Analysis
2003, 11(1):59–68.
Describe-evaluate-improve
(name assigned by reviewer)
Consultative approach that compares how a practice
is with how it ought to be. No information given as
to how it worked out what the practice ought to be
7 Borry P, Schotsmans P, Dierickx K. What is the role of
empirical research in bioethical reflection and
decision-making? An ethical analysis. Medicine, Health
Care and Philosophy 2004, 7(1):41–53.
Step-wise Empirical
Contributions
Proposal of how empirical data can be inputted at
each stage of a typical ethical decision making
process, rather than a presenting a methodology.
Data is always subservient to theory
8 Molewijk B.,Stiggelbout A, Otten W, Dupois H, Kievit J.
Empirical data and moral theory. A plea for integrated
empirical ethics. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
2004, 7:55-69
Integrated Empirical Ethics Broadly consultative approach which aims to achieve
strong interdisciplinary cooperation and the effective
dissolution of the fact/value distinction. Suggests that
either reflective equilibrium or pragmatic
hermeneutics might be able to achieve this.
9 Reiter-Theil S. Does empirical research make bioethics
more relevant? “The embedded researcher” as a
methodological approach. Medicine, Health Care and
Philosophy 2004, 7(1):17–29.
The Embedded Researcher Consultative approach where Information gathered
by a researcher ‘embedded’ in a situation is used to
inform the ethical decision from the ‘inside out’
although how exactly this is done is unclear
10 Arnason V. Sensible discussion in bioethics: Reflections
on interdisciplinary research. Cambridge Quarterly of
Healthcare Ethics 2005, 14(3):322–328.
Complementarity Thesis Data led consultative approach which tests whether
stakeholder views stand up to reason. It does not
describe how normative conclusions are generated
from this approach
11 Ebbesen M, Pedersen B. Using empirical research to
formulate normative ethical principles in biomedicine.
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 2007, 10(1):33–48.
Phenomenological
Hermeneutics and Wide
Reflective Equilibrium
Uses phenomenological hermeneutics to gather and
interpret data (using a partly dialogical and partly
consultative approach) and wide reflective
equilibrium to conduct the analysis and to generate
normative conclusions
12 Haimes E, Williams R. Sociology, ethics and the priority
of the particular: learning from a case study of
genetic deliberations. The British Journal of Sociology
2007, 58(3):457–476.
Sociology-led Phronesis
(name assigned by reviewer)
Data led consultative approach where moral theory
is only used to “find purchase” on the data. Unclear
how normative conclusions are drawn, although it
draws heavily on phronesis.
13 Draper H, Ives J. An empirical approach to bioethics:
social science 'of', 'for' and 'in' bioethics research.
Cognitie, Creier, Comportament. 2007, 11(2):319–330.
Encounters with experience Consultative approach which utilises reflective
equilibrium to integrate empirical data and ethical
theory. Early and less detailed exposition of ideas
presented in a later paper (17)
14 Widdershoven G, van der Scheer L. Theory and
methodology of empirical ethics: a pragmatic
hermeneutic perspective. In Empirical ethics in psychiatry.
Edited by Widdershoven G, McMillan J, Hope T, Van Der
Scheer L. Gosport: Oxford University Press; 2008:23–35.
Pragmatic Hermeneutics Process involving formation of dialogue between
stakeholders and an external analysis followed by the
generation hypotheses for policy, which are then put
back into the dialogue and refined
15 Doorn N. Applying Rawlsian approaches to resolve
ethical issues: inventory and setting of a research
agenda. Journal of business ethics 2009, 91(1):127–143.
Wide Reflective Equilibrium
and Overlapping Consensus
Method for integrating data and theory. Limited
detail about how the data is gathered and analysed
16 Nikku N, Eriksson B. Microethics in action. Bioethics 2006,
2(4):169–179.
Microethics Investigation of ‘everyday’ ethical problems. Unclear
as to how this empirical data should be integrated
with theory
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Table 1 Table showing included publications, with brief summary of methodology described (Continued)
17 Ives J. Draper H. Appropriate methodologies for
empirical bioethics: it's all relative. Bioethics 2009, 23
(4):249–258.
Reflective Equilibrium based
on ‘Encounters with
experience’
Version of the reflective equilibrium approach which
gathers data by sending the researcher into the field,
and seeks a balance in which data is refined by
theory and theory is refined by data.
18 Leget C, Borry P, De Vries R. ‘Nobody Tosses a Dwarf!
’The Relation between the Empirical and the
Normative Reexamined. Bioethics 2009, 23(4):226–235.
Critical Applied Ethics Consultative process that uses empirical data
throughout to constantly reassess and refine
normative outcomes (different exposition of 25)
19 Parker M. Two concepts of empirical ethics. Bioethics
2009, 23(4):202–213.
Teleological Expressivism Consultative process which gives a prominent role to
the public legitimisation of proposed policy. Limited detail
about the individual steps that comprise this process.
20 Kim S, Wall I, Stanczyk A, De Vries R. Assessing the
public's views in research ethics controversies:
deliberative democracy and bioethics as natural
allies. Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research
Ethics 2009, 4(4):3–16.
Deliberative Democracy A dialogical approach which differs from others as it
uses lay accounts and opinions rather than specific
stakeholders. The idea of this is to avoid decisions
being influenced by those with a vested interest.
Limited detail given on how normative conclusions are
drawn in this process, but explicit about the legitimacy
of conclusions being derived from democratic ideals.
21 Schleidgen S, Jungert M, Bauer R. Mission: Impossible?
On empirical-normative collaboration in ethical
reasoning. Ethical theory and moral practice 2010,
13(1): 59–71.
Distinct Methodological
Collaboration
A proposal that ethicists and social scientists should
work together by following the traditions of their
own disciplines and putting their findings together.
Limited detail about the process of actually
conducting the research.
22 van Delden J, van Thiel G. Reflective equilibrium as a
normative-empirical model in bioethics. In Reflective
equilibrium: Essays in honour of Robert Heeger, Edited by
ven der Burg W. van Willigenburg T. Dordrecht; Springer:
1998, 251–259.
Normative Empirical
Reflective Equilibrium
A version of reflective equilibrium which uses the
moral intuitions of stakeholders for its empirical data
23 Widdershoven G, Abma T, Molewijk B. Empirical ethics as
dialogical practice. Bioethics 2009, 23(4):236–248.
Response Evaluation
Hermeneutics
Dialogical process that begins by giving a voice to
the least heard group of stakeholders. The aim is to
reach a ‘mutual understanding’, from which
normative conclusions follow.
24 Abma T, Baur V, Molewijk B, Widdershoven G. Inter‐Ethics:
Towards an Interactive and Interdependent Bioethics.
Bioethics 2010, 24(5): 242–255.
Inter-ethics Dialogical process for decision making in concrete
situations. The ethicist acts as facilitator and may
draw on ethical theory to enrich the dialogue.
25 Leget C, Borry P. Empirical Ethics: The Case of Dignity
in End-of-Life Decisions. Ethical Perspectives 2010, 17(2):
231–250.
Critical Applied Ethics Consultative process that uses empirical data
throughout to constantly reassess and refine
normative outcomes (different exposition of 18)
26 Frith L. Symbiotic empirical ethics: a practical
methodology. Bioethics 2012, 26(4):198–206.
Symbiotic Empirical Ethics Five step consultative approach aiming to refine and
develop ethical theory, based on a naturalistic ethics
that sees practice and theory as symbiotically related
and mutually informing.
27 De Vries M, van Leeuwen E. Reflective equilibrium and
empirical data: third person moral experiences in
empirical medical ethics. Bioethics 2010, 24(4):490–498
Reflective Equilibrium:
Network Model with third
person moral experiences
Variation of wide reflective equilibrium designed to
help solve ethical problems in concrete situations.
Third person experiences are inputted into the
equilibrium with relevant moral theory
28 Hunt M, Carnevale F. Moral experience: a framework for
bioethics research. Journal of medical ethics 2011, 37
(11):658–662.
Moral experience
hermeneutics (name
assigned by reviewer)
Methodology designed to understand the moral
practice of a population and therefore does not fully
explore how to generate normative conclusions.
29 Landeweer E, Tineke A, Widdershoven G. Moral margins
concerning the use of coercion in psychiatry. Nursing
ethics 2011, 18(3):304–316.
Dialogical hermeneutics for
enhanced stakeholder
understanding/Inter-ethics
Dialogical approach that is very similar to inter-ethics (24)
30 Schicktanz S, Schweda M, Wynne, B. The ethics of ‘public
understanding of ethics’—why and how bioethics
expertise should include public and patients’ voices.
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 2012,15(2):129–139.
Ethics of public
understanding
Proposed tool for making decisions that are congruent
with the views of those affected. Uses a consultative
approach to gather data but is unclear about how this
is analysed and used to make decisions
31 Dunn M, Sheehan M, Parker M, Hope T. Toward
methodological innovation in empirical ethics
research. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
2012, 21(4):466–480.
Grounded moral analysis A constructivist account that aims for full integration
of empirical analysis and normative analysis to develop
normative claims that are justified and that have
real-world purchase. Methodology centres around an
iterative process of empirical research and theory being
used to influence and change each other until a
normative outcome is shaped by participants
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undertaken by the researcher and participants together.
These approaches generally aim to find a resolution to a
discrete problem. On the other pole we find Consultative
approaches, which tend to utilise an external ‘thinker’ who
gathers data and analyses it independently of the data col-
lection process, and then develops normative conclusions.
Essentially, this approach ‘consults’ with participants to
obtain their views and experiences, but participants do
not take part in the process of forming a normative con-
clusion. In consultative approaches the data can be gath-
ered in any number of ways and may come in many
different forms, and the aims of consultative approaches,
vary; ranging from theory development to the generation
of concrete answers to discrete problems.
Table 1 Table showing included publications, with brief summary of methodology described (Continued)
Moral conversation A dialogical approach coming from the same
theoretical standpoint as above. Intended to bring
about focussed engagement and reflection within
practice by forming a dialogue between stakeholders
Moral participation Again, from the same theoretical standpoint as
above. The researcher actively experiences a situation
and then undergoes a process of critical reflection
which must stand up to ethical reasoning
32 Rehmann-Sutter C, Porz R, Leach Scully J. How to Relate
the Empirical to the Normative. Cambridge Quarterly of
Healthcare Ethics 2012, 21(4):436–447.
Phenomenological
Hermeneutics
The researcher produces ethical arguments which, on
phenomenological foundations, the data provides the
conditions to evaluate. Involves hermeneutic ‘circles’-
including whether the future ‘reader’ of any
conclusion made will consider their findings to have
any normative authority
33 Ives J. A method of reflexive balancing in a pragmatic,
interdisciplinary and reflexive bioethics. Bioethics 2014.
28(6):302–312.
Reflexive Balancing Although utilising the concept of coherence this
methodology is distinct from reflective equilibrium in
that it gives initial weighting to certain ‘boundary’
principles with which coherence is sought but which
must then justify their own inclusion. This is likened to
a ‘null hypothesis’ which must be proven or disproven.
An explicitly pragmatic process, relying on a naturalistic
ethics that focuses on achieving a defensible
compromise in genuinely dilemmatic situations.
34 passed title screening
65 results from Web of Science42 results from MedLine 2472 results from Google Scholar
52 passed title screening 182 passed title screening
153 results once duplicates 
removed
179 abstracts Screened
26 records from other sources:
23 from bibliographies
3 from secondary 
searches of other results
104 agreed to reject 24 agreed to include
50 full texts reviewed38 Rejected
2 due to language
1 unable to access
12 included
36 subjected to data extraction
3 excluded at this time 
as ultimately did not 
meet inclusion criteria
Figure 1 PRISMA diagram combining both search periods.
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The consultative group was highly varied and could be
further sub-categorised according to the process used by the
‘thinker’ (or the researcher). Within the consultative group,
five methodologies propose a form of Wide Reflective
Equilibrium (RE), and five describe non-RE coherence
based methodologies. Eight methodologies were less clear
about the consultative process (or method) of drawing
normative conclusions - describing a non-specific ‘thinking-
through’ (our term). Within this latter group there is con-
siderable variation in where the locus of authority is
placed. Four give data priority over theory, one gives
theory priority over data, and three give equal weight
to both.
Finally, seven methodologies are neither clearly dialogical
nor consultative, and three methodologies (pragmatic her-
meneutics, deliberative democracy and integrated empir-
ical ethics) may comprise elements of both.
Discussion
The two poles of methodological orientation that we
have used to categorise the majority of methodologies
are useful in the sense that they provide a very general
way of thinking about how a normative conclusion can
be reached. In Dialogical approaches, the ethical analysis
and reaching of a normative conclusion is part of the re-
search encounter itself. Reaching consensus, in one form
NEITHER CLEARLY 
DIALOGICAL NOR 
CONSULTATIVE
DIALOGICAL     
PROCESS
CONSULTATIVE 
PROCESS
Inter-ethics (ID 24;29)
Response Evaluation Hermeneutics (ID 23)
‘Moral Experience’ Hermeneutics (ID 28)
Moral conversation (ID 31)
Pragmatic Hermeneutics (ID 14) 
Deliberative Democracy (ID 20)
Integrated Empirical Ethics (ID 8)
‘Coherence’ seeking: Reflective Equilibrium based 
‘Encounters with experience’ (ID 13, 17) 
Phenomenological Hermeneutics and Wide 
Reflective Equilibrium (ID 11)
Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Overlapping Consensus (ID 15) 
Network Model with third person moral experience (ID 27)
Normative Empirical Reflective Equilibrium (ID 22)
‘Coherence’ seeking: Non-Reflective Equilibrium based
Reflexive Balancing (ID 33)
Critical Applied Ethics (18;25)
Symbiotic Empirical Ethics (ID 26)
Grounded Moral Analysis (ID 31)
Moral Participation (ID 31)
Non-specific ‘Thinking through’/ Integration
Data led (‘bottom-up’)
Ethnography (ID 2) 
‘The Embedded Researcher’ (ID 9)
‘Iterative population-based ethics’ (ID 4)
Sociology led phronesis (ID 12) 
Theory led (‘top-down’)
Step-wise empirical contributions(ID 7)
Equal weighting
Teleological Expressivism (ID 19) 
Describe-Evaluate-Improve (ID 6)
Normative Ethnography (ID 3) 
Interdisciplinary Epoche (ID 1) 
Ethics of public understanding (ID 30)
Micro-ethics (ID 16)
Oppositional Collaboration (ID 5)
Complementarity Thesis (ID 10)
Distinct Methodological Collaboration (ID 21)
Phenomenological Hermeneutics (ID 32)
COMBINATION OF 
DIALOGICAL/
CONSULTATIVE
Figure 2 Categories illustrating methodological processes.
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or another, plays a significant role here, with moral au-
thority generated, for example, through a hermeneutic
‘fusing of horizons’ [18], or democratic mandate [19]. By
contrast, consultative approaches involve explicit engage-
ment with stakeholder views, but with the ethical analysis
being undertaken post-engagement, by the researcher or
the research team. In these latter accounts, stakeholders
feed into the ethical analysis, but are not involved in it dir-
ectly. Moral authority, in these approaches, is more likely
to come from theoretical soundness.
Distinguishing between these two poles of methodo-
logical orientation fails, however, to accommodate the sig-
nificant differences within the orientations themselves. The
consultative orientation, in particular, includes a wide range
of divergent methods which assume different epistemo-
logical and meta-ethical commitments. What this variation
illustrates, quite strikingly, is not only the wide variation in
methods, but also the attendant variation in the aims and
epistemologies associated with these methods. Different
methodologies produce different kinds of knowledge, such
that the epistemological status of the conclusions arising
out of, for example a project using ‘inter-ethics’ will be
quite different from a project using ‘deliberative democ-
racy’, ‘symbiotic bioethics’ or a ‘network model with third
person moral experience’. Consequently, how normative
conclusions are justified – the source of moral authority -
will be different in each, which will affect the grounds
upon which any conclusions can be accepted.
Considering the results of the systematic review, we
feel that there are three further questions that are immedi-
ately provoked by the data presented above and the broad
differences we have observed across the methodologies
identified. These questions revolve around how a nor-
mative conclusion can be justified, the analytic process
through which that conclusion is reached, and the kind of
conclusions that are sought. In the remainder of this paper
we outline those questions and discuss, briefly, their rele-
vance and importance.
How a normative conclusion can be justified: can moral
justification be found through consensus or coherence?
This question mirrors a general philosophical debate
around what justifies claims to moral knowledge, or to
knowledge in general. In-depth engagement with this
question may require immersion in philosophical and
sociological epistemology, philosophy of science and the-
ories of truth, which we do not have space for in this
paper. The main point we are trying to make, here, is
that there is a long tradition of philosophical thought
that deals with these questions of justification, know-
ledge and truth, and a commitment to any specific em-
pirical bioethics methodology is likely to involve aligning
oneself with a particular epistemology about how a claim
to moral knowledge can be justified.
A research method that appeals to consensus to justify
a normative conclusion finds moral authority in agree-
ment of some kind. Some ‘dialogical’ methods rely on her-
meneutic philosophy to explain how this agreement works,
appealing to a ’fusion of horizons’ premised on achieving a
shared understanding and interpretation of the world.
These methods rely, broadly speaking, on accepting the
view that a process of dialogue can lead to people under-
standing the world in the same way, which leads to agree-
ment on the correct solution. Many dialogical methods
are based on facilitating that dialogue e.g. [18], and that
facilitation comprises the empirical and ethical research
project. The normative conclusion generated through that
dialogical process becomes the findings of the research.
Alternatively, some approaches seek a different kind of
consensus: one based on a political philosophical claim
about democratic authority rather than a meta-ethical
claim about shared interpretation and moral knowledge
[19]. Agreement, here, is not the basis of justification but,
rather, justification flows from the legitimacy of the demo-
cratic processes invoked to draw normative conclusions.
Conversely, a research method that appeals to coher-
ence finds moral authority, broadly speaking, in rational-
ity and consistency. The difficult question that needs an
answer is what ‘coherence’ means, what it looks like, and
what has to ‘cohere’ with what. One option is coherence
with moral theory, and a conclusion is coherent if it fits,
logically, with a particular theoretical viewpoint. This is
one traditional (analytic) philosophical approach, which
an integrative empirical bioethics would tend to reject
due to the lack of attention it accords to the contingent
features of ‘real-world’ settings. An alternative option is
that coherence may be found between data and theory
(as in narrow reflective equilibrium) or between a num-
ber of relevant considerations (as in wide reflective equi-
librium). A research method that draws on coherence
will tend to involve some process of balancing, where a
coherent position is found between the various relevant
considerations.
Many of the consultative approaches identified are based
on coherence, the majority of which explicitly refer to
wide reflective equilibrium, and seek to find a balance (an
‘equilibrium’) between, for example: background theories,
moral principles, morally relevant facts, moral experiences
of others, considered moral judgements of the ‘thinker’
e.g. [20]. This method gives all the considerations listed
equal weighting, with none having greater epistemic au-
thority than any other. An alternative methodology that
draws on coherence, reflexive balancing [1], rejects the no-
tion that all considerations have equal epistemic status
and uses empirical data to posit ‘quasi-foundational moral
principles’ around which coherence is built; where coher-
ence is sought between mutually supporting principles
and claims. In yet another contrasting position, the three
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methodological approaches put forward by Dunn et al. [4]
interpret coherence with reference to argumentative stan-
dards in ‘real-world’ practical reasoning, rather than in
terms of any alignment between moral theory and empir-
ical facts. Here, the purpose of the research is to develop
normative claims in which there is coherence between
universal standards of justification for convincing argu-
ments of all kinds, and relevant contextual considerations
that enable agents to be convinced to act in line with the
requirements of these arguments.
The analytic process through which that conclusion is
reached: should we prioritise the thinker, the theory or
the stakeholders?
One of the most fundamental questions that must be con-
sidered is who, or what, should be doing the substantive
analytic work in empirical bioethics research. Broadly speak-
ing, in the methods and methodologies identified above
we find three possible answers to this question.
First, a methodology where the thinker does the work is
reliant upon a single central person (or sometimes central
team). This would usually be the researcher, or the research
team, who takes the analytic burden and whose judgement
is central to the analytic process. Any normative conclu-
sions belong to that ‘thinker’ (or group of thinkers), and a
different, but similarly robust and coherent, thinker (or
thinkers) could reach a different conclusion, and this may
impact on how the conclusions are presented, requiring,
perhaps, a certain amount of reflexivity see [21]. In our
sample of included methodologies those that prioritise the
thinker tend to be consultative, and these include all the
methodologies that draw on reflective equilibrium.
Second, a methodology that prioritises the theory still
requires a person to conduct the analysis, but the focus
is on the logical and consistent development and appli-
cation of theory, such that the theory dominates the nor-
mative analysis. This kind of method wants to generate
conclusions that, once the theory is agreed upon, would
be binding for all rational agents (or, at least, all rational
agents who subscribe to that theory, thus expressed). In
doing this, the ‘correct’ theory is identified in advance, and
one’s normative conclusions would be the result of how
the theory is applied, given the contingencies of the em-
pirical data that is taken into account. It is noteworthy
that some methodologies, for example Frith’s ‘symbiotic
bioethics’, attempt to use data to help refine theory, and
then apply that more contextualised theory to the problem
in hand (rather than deciding on the theory in advance of
the research process). Other methodologies, such as Borry
et al’s ‘step wise empirical contributions’ [22] aim to input
empirical data into various stages of the ethical decision
making process, but use the data to support argument
defined by theory that is not subject to revision after
considering the data.
Third, a methodology that prioritises the stakeholders
does away with the central role of the thinker or theory.
Instead, the analysis is the product of a group process
that connects a broad range of voices to link relevant
practical experiences to ethical considerations in a range
of differently structured facilitative processes (e.g. dis-
cussion groups, interviews). In doing this, the role of the
researcher is less central, and becomes more one of fa-
cilitation and process than substantive analytic contribu-
tion – such as in the dialogical methods identified in our
review. The researcher does not generate or own the
normative conclusions, but rather discovers and com-
municates the conclusions reached through the research
process (whether that is stakeholder dialogue, demo-
cratic consensus, or any other kind of process).
The kind of conclusion that is sought: should we aim for
particularity or generalisability?
The extent to which we might want our conclusions to
be particular to a specific time and context, or more uni-
versally applicable, will have a significant bearing on the
method we choose. Methodologies that prioritise ab-
stract theory may have a better claim to drawing univer-
salisable conclusions than methods that tie an analysis
to a specific dataset or a specific group of people. Meth-
odologies that prioritise the particular [23], for example,
or which seek a dialogical consensus between a specific
group of people, may have difficulty drawing conclusions
that go beyond that particular problem or context. One
way of understanding such approaches may be to frame
them as action research, with the specific aim of evaluat-
ing and changing a discrete area of practice rather than
making general claims about ethics. Other methods, for
example [2], explicitly aim to use empirical studies to in-
form and develop generalisable theory, which can then
be applied in other contexts.
If we wish to conduct research that is focussed on a
very specific problem, and are not concerned with mak-
ing generalised moral claims, we need a method that will
accommodate this narrow focus. Similarly, if we wish to
be able to make universal moral claims, we need a method
that either accommodates large scale generalisible empir-
ical research, or that has a process for moving from the
particular to the generalisible by way of theory generation,
and which has an attendant meta-ethics that we can de-
fend (or at least explain). This question, and the one
above, tracks very closely debates in moral philosophy
over particularism vs. universalism, and the debate around
moral relativism. These debates are concerned respectively
with whether or not one can make moral claims that apply
universally, and whether or not a moral judgement can
only be correct relative to the context about which it is
made or the person who made it. Clearly, however one an-
swers the two methodological questions above, one is
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making a claim about these debates, and making a state-
ment about which meta–ethical view is correct.
Limitations
Before drawing our final conclusions, we need to reflect
on the limitations of this review. First, while our search
strategy was robust, it is likely that some relevant papers
have been missed because our search terms were not as
refined and focused as they might have been. The range
of different terminology used in this field is significant,
and our choice of search terms was based on our exist-
ing familiarity with the literature. It is possible that there
are papers in existence that are highly relevant that none-
theless use terminology that we are not familiar with.
Should those papers exist, our search terms are unlikely to
have captured them.
Second, we have been unable to include, or search for,
non-English papers, meaning that our review is limited
to English language publications. We are aware that
there are groups and individuals working on empirical
bioethics methods across Europe and beyond, and we
have only been able to capture their English language
papers. Many people working on this topic may not have
published in English at all, and it is a limitation that this
work could not be included.
Third, and finally, our analysis and subsequent classifi-
cation is based on our own (systematic) interpretation of
the field, and cannot be considered to be the last word.
We feel that our categorisation of the papers identified in
the review offers a useful way to look at the strategies,
methods and methodologies in empirical bioethics, and
through that we have highlighted some specific questions
that we feel are important to consider when choosing a
methodology. However, the questions we have interro-
gated are by no means exhaustive or defining of the field.
Conclusion
It is important to recognise that the questions we have
asked above, about consensus/coherence, particularity/
universalizability, or who/what takes analytic priority, are
all interconnected. They concern central questions of nor-
mative justification that no empirical ethicist can afford to
ignore, and have significant implications for the design
of empirical ethics studies. If one is going to design an
empirical ethics study correctly, methodological decisions
must be responsive to the different theoretical positions
that underpin alternative approaches to empirical ethics
research. When considering which methodology or re-
search methods to adopt in any particular study, re-
searchers need to think carefully about the nature of the
claims they wish to generate through their analyses, and
how these claims align with the aims of the research. In
disseminating these claims, moreover, researchers must
also be able to articulate and defend one or more of these
positions in order to convince their audiences about the
veracity and scope of the normative conclusions they
draw.
The pressing need to engage with these kinds of ques-
tion is highlighted by increasing calls for more public
engagement in policy relevant ethical deliberation. A
good example of this is the recent Nuffield Council on
Bioethics working party on emerging biotechnologies,
which calls for a ‘public discourse ethics’. This report
[24], in chapter 4, discusses the virtues and benefits of
engaging the public in these policy debates, such as cand-
our, sustainability, equity, accountability (mirroring the
kind of language used to talk about patient and public in-
volvement in health and policy research more gener-
ally), but does not consider how this can be achieved, and
seems to take for granted that it is (a) possible and (b)
methodologically unproblematic.
The observations made in this paper highlight the fact
that this kind of methodology is anything but unprob-
lematic. Even within the relatively narrowly defined ‘in-
tegrative’ approaches to empirical bioethics that we have
focused on, there is little in common between the vari-
ous traditions of empirical ethical enquiry that we have
identified. Whilst there are superficial similarities in the
ways that identical research methods are made use of,
the different meta-ethical and epistemological commitments
that undergird the range of methodological approaches re-
hearse many of the central foundational disagreements
that play out within moral philosophy and bioethical ana-
lysis more broadly. There is little common ground that
transcends these disagreements, and the disparate nature
of the methodological literature arguably makes it difficult
to view empirical bioethics as a coherent (and ultimately
legitimate) research enterprise. It has not developed as a
cohesive body of work with a shared intellectual heri-
tage and agreed standards, as one might see in an estab-
lished discipline or methodological tradition. Rather, it
has emerged as a body of work comprising distinct and
entirely bespoke methodological responses to a ‘problem’
that is not always clearly defined, or understood in the
same way.
In our view, the heterogeneity we have observed is not
a problem in itself. Difference adds to the richness of the
field and, certainly in its infancy, a field such as empirical
bioethics will surely benefit from experimentation and var-
iety. The methodological and epistemological differences
we have seen, even within the narrow scope of ‘integrative’
approaches, are no more trenchant than the differences
we might observe, for example, within the social sci-
ences, and the differences seem to reflect legitimate
theoretical disagreements over the purpose and nature of
ethical enquiry.
This does, however, make it difficult, if not impossible,
to critically assess a piece of empirical bioethics work
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with reference to anything outside of the work itself.
The fact that the emerging literature tends to focus on
developing and articulating methodologies that are be-
spoke to particular sets of questions, in a particular con-
text, makes it difficult to look at a piece of work from an
external perspective and assess its quality, because all of
the justificatory work has to be done almost from scratch
to validate that piece of work. The nature of this (early)
work is that it is experimental, creative, and crosses discip-
linary boundaries, and there is not an established canon of
literature that can be referred to. A pioneer, if we might
use that analogy, has to go it alone.
When we consider these characteristics alongside the
requirements of funding and publication, and the (under-
standable) imperfections of peer review, it is not difficult
to see how work in empirical bioethics could struggle
to find a place. The shortcuts that can be taken when
explaining and justifying work undertaken within clear
disciplinary silos are not available to empirical bioeth-
ics. There is no standard approach to cite, there is no
accepted methodology or set of methods to fall back
on, and the process of offering justification for every
methodological choice from first principles takes a lot
of space, which is rarely available.
One way forward may be to attempt to find some level
of consensus on what is required of an empirical bioeth-
ics methodology, and what standards we might use to
assess the quality of work proposed and/or undertaken
under this broad umbrella. Establishing a consensus that
outlines areas of agreement may be able to provide some
external and relatively concrete validation for at least some
kinds of work. Such areas of agreement might include, for
example: what assumptions one may legitimately make,
and whether the theoretical assumptions behind one’s ap-
proach need to be stated, explained or fully justified (from
first principles).
Our concern about that kind of solution (aside from
the, perhaps obvious, difficulty of reaching a consensus),
is that the field may not be mature enough to put any of
these questions to bed, and given that it would be dam-
aging to the legitimacy of the empirical bioethics en-
deavour to try to avoid them.
For now, our view is that everyone working in this
field must live with a great deal of uncertainty, and will
have to work hard to explain what they are doing and
why it ought to be taken seriously. If we are trying to do
a new kind of ethics, using new kinds of methodologies,
then we should be put under pressure to justify and ar-
ticulate that new approach clearly. At this stage in the
development of empirical bioethics, that means engaging
explicitly and meaningfully with questions concerning
the kinds of moral claim that empirical bioethicists want
to be able to make, about normative justification and the
methodological process, and about the coherence of
these different components of their work. So long as this
is done, the evident heterogeneity doesn’t matter, and
should in fact be welcomed.
Endnotes
aThe Cochrane handbook is intended to be used for
systematic reviews of interventions. In light of this not
all stages were relevant.
bThe project was carried out as an undergraduate stu-
dent project, with a strict time limit and limited resources.
cBibliographies were supplied by JI and MD, which were
generated for teaching purposes.
dBackground reading suggested a body of literature on
methodologies within business ethics which could also
be relevant to this research.
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